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Today, the great majority of African and Latin American countries have 
presidential term limits inscribed in their constitutions. Yet, Bolivia’s Evo 
Morales and Guinea’s Alpha Condé are only recent examples of incumbents 
trying to extend their time in office – and of the acute political conflicts that 
follow from these bold moves. 
 • A presidential term limit is the constitutional rule that restricts the number 
of terms that the president of a given state may serve. In presidential systems, 
such limits are a key check on the power of the incumbent. Their goal is to 
constrain personalism, prevent power abuse, and to promote party competition 
and alternation in power.
 • In practice, term limits have not always been an effective instrument to stop the 
president from taking office again and again. Since the 1990s, Latin America 
and sub-Saharan Africa have been hit by an amendment fever that today ac-
cumulates to about 60 approved reforms and additional failed attempts. Term 
limits have been abolished, amended, or re-interpreted recurrently, but have 
certainly not disappeared from the political scene entirely.  
 • In contrast to power holders’ attacks on term limits, survey results from Africa 
show that the societies they govern value this constitutional rule. Besides, in 
several countries popular protests have repeatedly sought to defend term limits 
against incumbents aspiring to extending their time in office beyond the term 
limits imposed by their constitutions.
Policy Implications
Term-limit abolition is a good indicator of a democratic backlash, and usually 
the last step in a series of institutional assaults that previously led to the concen-
tration of power. But term limits are more often relaxed and circumvented than 
they are abolished. These additional executive moves can also impact democracy 
negatively and provoke societal conflicts. Therefore, all adjustments of the term-
limit rule should be observed closely by integrating them in systematic monitor-
ing activities, and addressed directly in political dialogues.
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Checking Executive Power with Term-Limit Rules
Surprising to many in Europe, the regulation of presidential term limits has become 
a key battleground in many Africa[1] and Latin American democracies. Constitu-
tional rules that restrict the number of terms that the president of a given state 
may serve are typical of political systems with directly elected presidents: namely, 
presidential and semi-presidential modes of government. In such systems, terms 
are fixed and parliaments typically cannot vote the president out of office during 
their incumbency. Term limits were first adopted in Latin America in the early nine-
teenth century, and remained a rare institution outside this region until the middle 
of the twentieth one.[2] However when (semi-)presidential systems of government 
began to diffuse globally and the direct election of the president thereafter became 
de rigueur (Elgie 2016), particularly with the third wave of democratisation in the 
1980s and 1990s, many countries resumed or adopted presidential term limits. This 
rule is perhaps the most important contribution of Latin America to the theory and 
practice of liberal democracy (Corrales 2018: 194).
In theory, the intention behind the rule is to prevent personalism and power 
abuses through the limitation of the executive’s time in office. Since Ancient Greece 
and the Roman Empire, term limits have been associated with democracy and per-
petual rule with tyranny. Incumbents have plenty of advantages – agenda control, 
appointment powers, greater media coverage, unaccountable entourages, patron-
age resources –, ones which they accumulate with the passing of time, and often to 
the detriment of political adversaries. These advantages are reflected in their elec-
toral success. If incumbents stand for re-election, they win in 70 per cent of cases, 
as Przeworski (2015: 104) has shown in a study of 2,230 contested presidential 
elections held around the globe between 1788 and 2008. Term limits put a brake 
on incumbents’ ability to perpetuate their stay in office by promoting competition 
and alternation in power. Certainly, they constrain electoral accountability (Manin 
1997) and are probably too blunt as an institution to protect citizens against presi-
dents taking advantage of incumbency (Cheibub 2007: 167). However, as a con-
straint on majority rule, term limits are regarded as an institution that strengthens 
liberal democracy.
In practice, the term-limit rule has not always been an efficient instrument to 
stop the president from seeking office again and again. Two indicators of this dif-
ficulty can be cited here. For one thing, the rule does not look the same everywhere. 
There is not such a thing as a term-limit rule, and different rule types have poten-
tially different implications. At the extreme ends of the spectrum, there are those 
rules that prohibit any presidential re-election and alternately those that allow for 
indefinite re-election. However term-limit rules may take other forms too, as the 
next section will illustrate. Moreover, when combined with the length of the presi-
dential term, the range and level of potential restrictions on presidential power vary 
even further. It is obvious that longer terms in unlimited re-election settings are not 
a genuine constraint on power, but the effects of other rule types and rule combina-
tions on presidential power are more difficult to assess.
A second indicator of this difficulty, meanwhile, is that compliance with the rule 
and rule enforcement also noticeably vary across both countries and time. In fact, 
there is a tension between rulers and rules because term limits test the political ac-
tors’ amenability to accepting constraints on their personal interest in remaining 
1  The terms “sub-
Saharan Africa” and 
“Africa,” as well as other 
corresponding adjectives, 
are used interchange-
ably in this Focus. Both 
refer, consequently, to the 
49 states located on the 
African continent south of 
the Sahara Desert.
2 The US-American 
constitution initially did not 
prescribe a president term 
limit. However, George 
Washington set up an 
informal practice of step-
ping down after two terms. 
It was only in 1951 – after 
Roosevelt having won 
three terms – that the two-
term limit was introduced 
into the constitution.
   3    GIGA FOCUS | GLOBAL | NO. 1 | JANUARY 2020 
in power. The lack of compliance is a highly personalised scenario wherein rulers 
prevail over rules (Baturo 2014). It manifests in varied forms and intensities, such 
as rule manipulation, circumvention, or alteration. The excessively high rate of in-
stitutional change indicates that the rule does not manage to prevail over fluctua-
tions in the distribution of power and in preferences (Brinks, Levitsky, and Murillo 
2019). Therefore, a certain rule stability is necessary to genuinely constrain power. 
Since the late 1990s, Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa have been swept 
by a corrective amendment fever that today accumulates to approximately 60 ap-
proved reforms and additional failed attempts. The recurrent reforms of the term-
limit rule may not come as a surprise given that personalism – either in the form 
of “Big Man rule” or continuismo – is a widespread political feature. However, the 
comparison of the two world regions in the last few decades has also revealed that 
strong executives often fail to eradicate this rule for once and for all. A more com-
mon pattern is the opposition, civil society, and the president themself engaging 
in debates on term limits, making the story of presidential term limits a never- 
ending one.  
The Many Faces of Presidential Term-Limit Rules
Rule types and their reform paths are embedded in related countries’ individual 
trajectories and historical contexts, but a cross-regional overview also shows some 
general trends too. At the beginning of 2020, two concrete facts can be established. 
First, presidential term limits are the rule rather than the exception in both of these 
regions. Looking at the countries which are presidential democracies, only four out 
of 39 African constitutions and four out of 19 Latin American ones do not provide 
for any limitation on the president’s time in office.[3] Second, constitutions in the 
two regions offer a variety of rule types that differ with regards to the number of 
terms a president is allowed to serve and regarding the possibility of serving further 
ones at some point in the future. The most restrictive rule is that of a single presi-
dential term without any possibility of re-election – the textbook case is Mexico, 
with its famous sexenio – which facilitated the predominant party’s rule for about 
a century and did not change after the democratic transition. The immediately next 
type is also that of a single term, but includes the possibility of re-election after a 
term away from office – Chile and Panama are cases in point here. Other rules limit 
the total number of terms to two or three (e.g. Benin and Ecuador), while the last 
rule type limits the initial number of presidential terms but allows for the return to 
the executive office after a term break (e.g. Brazil and Mozambique).
Beyond these generalities, there are some regional patterns. Latin America has 
the widest variety of term-limit rules, since all mentioned types can be found there. 
However the dominant type is that of the restriction to one term, with 11 cases out 
of 19 – coming either with the possibility of a further non-consecutive term or not. 
Rule diversification came with time in Latin America, as during the 1980s and until 
Peru’s constitutional reform in 1993 presidential term limits allowing for immedi-
ate re-election were absent from constitutional designs. Time also brought a relaxa-
tion of the rule in many cases, and even the removal in four countries. 
In contrast, the standard term-limit design in Africa is the two-term. Today, 
28 African constitutions provide for a two-term limit. Seven African constitutions 
3 Ten sub-Saharan 
African countries were not 
included in the analysis. 
Lesotho, Mauritius, Ethio-
pia, Botswana, and South 
Africa have parliamentarian 
systems of government in 
place while Eswatini is a 
monarchy. In the Comoros, 
the head of state is subject 
to a unique system of 
rotation. South Sudan 
still has a transitional 
constitution in force, while 
Eritrea as well as Somalia 
have never held elections 
to date. In Latin America, 
meanwhile, Cuba as well 
as the other countries with 
parliamentarian systems in 
the anglophone Caribbean 
are not included. In total, in 
Latin America we count 18 
pure presidential systems 
and one semi-presidential 
one (Haiti).
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allow for additional non-consecutive terms. Among them are mainly former Por-
tuguese or Spanish colonies, where the conditions for non-consecutive terms are 
clearly spelled out. Conversely, Burundi and Senegal introduced recently some am-
biguity into their constitutions that allows for varying interpretations and makes 
possible a return to power after a one-term break. 
Why are the details on the rule type important? There are three major implica-
tions here. First, the number of permitted terms affects the time that a president 
has available for the implementation of their policy agenda. In Latin America, most 
presidents rule for either four or five years. If the constitution allows two consecu-
tive terms in office, the president seeking re-election has in total more time – eight 
to ten years – to implement their policy programme. Second, the number of permit-
ted terms influences just how far the incumbent’s advantages can be consolidated. 
The longer the time in office, the larger the risk of patronage networks sprawling out 
or state resources being embezzled. Third, the option to stand again for presidential 
office after a break influences the role of former presidents. If the door is left open 
to a potential return, they have a strong incentive to keep pulling the strings from 
behind the scenes and to maintain their power networks. At the global level, the cir-
cumstances surrounding Russia’s Vladimir Putin are the most prominent example 
of such a staged comeback. 
The incentives to wait in the wings for a return to the presidency are particular-
ly strong if presidents are still young, and further if they are not offered alternative 
career options due to a weak private sector. This is why the Mo Ibrahim Foundation 
launched a prize for leadership achievements that grants selected former heads of 
state an award of USD 5 million over 10 years. Liberia’s former head of state Ellen 
Johnson Sirleaf was the last chosen laureate, after having respected the country’s 
two-term limit. 
Paths of Stability and Change
The rule type prevailing in the respective countries today is the result of a long-
term process and, in many cases, it is unlikely to be the final word thereon. Both the 
Figure 1  
Term-Limit Rule 
Types in Latin Amer-
ica and Sub-Saharan 
Africa as of January 
2020
Source: Authors’ own 
compilation, using map 
chart.net
   5    GIGA FOCUS | GLOBAL | NO. 1 | JANUARY 2020 
direction and the frequency of change are important. In the reform fever that has 
swept the two regions in the last few decades, reforms were directed towards easing 
the possibility of a presidential comeback – either immediately or at some point in 
the future. Nonetheless, the recent cases of Ecuador (2018) and Togo (2019) also 
reveal opposing trends. The individual trajectories of the presidential term-limit 
rule are quite singular meanwhile, but many of these processes show recurrent fea-
tures and some general trends appear across time and regions. Below we outline six 
individual trajectories – three each from Africa and Latin America respectively – as 
well as their recent consequences for electoral turnover. 
From Toothless Term Limits to Stability: Chad, Ghana, Senegal
Term limits are associated with democratic rule, but may also be present in au-
thoritarian constitutions. In the latter, they are frequently toothless. In Chad, its 
introduction feigned liberalisation but never actually constrained the incumbent’s 
time in office. The authoritarian leader Idriss Déby introduced twice a two-term 
limit as a strategic move, but he also made sure that it does not pose a threat to 
his power. In 1996, Déby’s government was under pressure from France to com-
plete the constitutional consultation process after he had ruled for six years under 
a transitional charter. In the meanwhile, many other African countries had adopted 
democratic constitutions in which term limits were a standard feature. However, 
the term-limit clause was abolished in 2005 before it could prohibit Déby from run-
ning for another term. In his 2016 election campaign, still-incumbent Déby pledged 
to reintroduce the term limit in order to facilitate electoral turnover. 
At first sight, this might seem a surprising move by a leader who until then had 
ruled the country uninterrupted for some 26 years. However, the re-introduction 
of the term limit was accompanied by the creation of a full presidential system of 
government that granted an already powerful president even more prerogatives. 
Moreover, the new term limit does not apply retroactively. Thus Déby is allowed to 
run for another two terms and to potentially rule until 2033, which would mean a 
total of 43 years in power. Besides Chad, there are a few other examples of countries 
in Africa ruled by a long-term leader and where the term limits prescribed in the 
constitution do not constrain the prospects of the ruler in the near future (such as 
Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Togo).
In contrast, Senegal is a puzzling case where the inscribed term limit has never 
induced an incumbent to step down but where term-limit reforms have increas-
ingly steered public debate and mobilised public protest. Moreover, electoral turno-
ver occurred twice – in 2000 and 2012 – despite the unstable term-limit rule. The 
country’s legacy of constitutional restrictions to presidential tenure dates back to 
1970, when a two-term limit was introduced for the first time. In 1991, the two-term 
limit was introduced for a second time – but incumbent Abdou Diouf initiated its 
elimination in 1998, long before it would have forced him to step down. Two years 
later, the electoral victory of Abdoulaye Wade brought to an end the Parti Social-
iste’s 40-year rule. Following his campaign pledges, Wade launched constitutional 
reform that hardly cut any presidential powers but which did re-introduce a term 
limit. However, in his second presidential term, Wade argued that his first term did 
not count towards the two-term limit rule because it was only introduced after he 
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had come to power. The Senegal Constitutional Council shared Wade’s interpreta-
tion, and he was allowed to run for another term in 2012. Yet civil society and the 
opposition responded with intense protests to Wade’s third-term bid, and he even-
tually lost the elections (Heyl 2019). 
Wade’s successor Macky Sall pledged in his own campaign to respect the term 
limit. However, in the most recent constitutional reform of 2016 the term-limit rule 
was softened through the adoption of more ambiguous wording. Moreover, Sall 
sacked a public official in October 2019 after he had publicly stated that the Sen-
egalese constitution does not allow Sall to stand for a third term. In his last press 
conference of 2019, Sall refused to identify a clear position regarding his potential 
third candidacy (Diop 2020; Rogers 2019). These recent events show that the his-
tory of presidents contesting the term limit continues, but the heated public debate 
in response to these attempts also suggests that Senegalese civil society is gearing 
up to defend the term limit once again. 
Still, not all African term-limit rules are subject to contestation or manipula-
tion. The case of Ghana proves the opposite in fact. The country’s term-limit rule 
remains untouched since its introduction in 1992, and it induced two electoral turn-
overs in 2000 and 2008. Ghana has a stable two-party system and regular alterna-
tion in power. Moreover, electoral turnovers there are not only the result of the 
two-term limit. In the most recent presidential election of 2016, then-incumbent 
John Mahama was defeated after having served only one term. Benin, Mali, Liberia, 
São Tomé e Príncipe, and Sierra Leone are other examples of African countries in 
which the term limit is respected and has induced electoral turnovers. In ones like 
Mozambique and Tanzania, term limits were also repeatedly respected; here, presi-
dents changed but the dominant party still remained in power. 
Seeking Continuity with Different Term Limits: Argentina, Uruguay,  
Bolivia
The variety in Latin American presidential term limits and their different implica-
tions became evident during the three presidential electoral processes that took 
place last October in South America. In Argentina and Bolivia, the incumbent presi-
dents were seeking re-election. In Uruguay, it was the ruling party that was seeking 
to keep hold of the presidency for a further term. None of them ultimately achieved 
what they were looking for, but the consequences were different for each. 
Back in the 1980s, when these countries – as many others in the region – made 
transitions to democracy, the presidential-term-limit rule looked quite similar for 
all three: presidents could run again for executive office, but they had to wait for 
an interval of one term because constitutional rules banned immediate re-election. 
Since then, the term-limit rule has followed different trajectories in the three cases 
and today it only prevails in its original form in Uruguay. Since democratic transi-
tion in 1985, two presidents have returned to their position after a five-year in-
terregnum in accordance with the constitution. The last one was President Tabaré 
Vásquez (2005–2010, 2015–2020), from the leftist alliance Frente Amplio. Under 
different presidents, the Frente Amplio has been governing uninterruptedly since 
2005. But in the most recent elections, it lost in the run-off by the very narrow mar-
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gin of just over 37,000 votes. Not only were the electoral results tight, but they were 
also only confirmed some days after election day – when the electoral court finally 
concluded the counting of absentee ballots. Nonetheless, the losing Frente Amplio 
peacefully accepted the defeat. A party alternation will take place in Uruguay with 
the changeover of government in March for the first time in 15 years. The long spell 
of same-party government did not involve rule change, nor a deterioration of the 
electoral process. 
In Argentina, Mauricio Macri (2015–2019) was seeking re-election last Oc-
tober, but he lost in the first round. His defeat meant the return to power of the 
Peronists, who had run the presidency for three consecutive terms before Macri. 
In 1994, a constitutional reform authorised immediate re-election in Argentina.[4] 
Then-ruling President Carlos Menem (1989–1995) was able to profit from it and, 
indeed, served another term (1995–1999). The term-limit rule has been stable since 
then. Menem tried to circumvent it in the late 1990s, but failed. The chances to prof-
it from re-election have been uneven though, with the Peronist Party traditionally 
being electorally stronger: the Kirchner couple – first Néstor (2003–2007), then 
his wife Cristina (2007–2011, 2011–2015) – ruling, as noted, for three consecutive 
terms, if taken together. As the comparative literature suggests, rule authorisation 
in almost every case means that the president will seek re-election; moreover, a re-
election bid is likely to be successful, as incumbents have plenty of advantages in 
electoral contests. 
In Latin America, between the late 1970s and 2017 incumbents sought re-
election on 27 occasions and only failed on three of them (Marsteintredet 2019). 
Macri’s recent defeat adds to the minority group, but his single-term presidency has 
some additional historical relevance for Argentina. In fact, Macri finished his term 
despite severe socio-economic constraints and against a historical background of 
political instability that has particularly affected non-Peronists governments. In a 
context of political and economic crisis, party alternation in power provided for an 
institutional exit – much in contrast to the situations of protest and social unrest 
that erupted in several neighbouring countries (Llanos and Maia 2019). 
Events in Bolivia, meanwhile, contrast with the previous two cases. Morales, 
the charismatic leader of the Movement to Socialism (MAS) and president of Bo-
livia since 2006, sought a fourth presidential mandate in last October’s presidential 
elections despite having been defeated in the 2016 referendum, when his country’s 
people rejected a constitutional reform to allow him to run for another consecutive 
term. This outcome was thanks also to a controversial ruling by the Constitutional 
Court that in 2017 changed the meaning of the 2009 constitution, stating that rules 
limiting the president’s chance to run for office again violated constitutional politi-
cal rights.[5] But the electoral results of October 2019 did not turn out as expected by 
the president. They were objected to on the grounds of allegations of serious fraud, 
which triggered weeks of intense and violent popular protest. Facing the withdrawal 
of support from the heads of the armed forces and the police, Morales resigned and 
fled abroad. Now he lives in exile in Argentina, and cannot stand as a candidate in 
the recently announced presidential elections that will take place on 3 May. 
These are not just idiosyncratic cases. They tell stories that will also look fa-
miliar to readers in different contexts. The cases of Ghana and Uruguay represent 
seemingly robust rule within the framework of consolidated party systems. Where 
rules are followed and respected, such as in these two countries, parties alternate in 
4 Presidents rule for 
four-year terms and can 
be re-elected for another 
immediate one. After these 
two consecutive terms, 
they may come back fol-
lowing an interval of four 
years.
5 According to differ-
ent press reports, the 
Constitutional Court will 
decide on the legality of 
this decision soon. Morales 
had already been favoured 
by a court ruling in 2013, 
which allowed him to run 
for the presidency in 2014. 
On that occasion, the 
president circumvented 
the presidential term limits. 
The argument was that the 
constitution of 2009 had 
installed a new institutional 
setting, such that the presi-
dential term he had served 
before it did not apply in 
the successive counting.
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power peacefully and regularly. In contrast, presidential term limits are toothless in 
authoritarian contexts, such as Chad, where rule stability or change do not neces-
sarily involve changes in the political regime. Meanwhile, recurrent amendment or 
reinterpretation leading to progressive rules’ relaxation in consolidating democra-
cies, such as Bolivia, shows how personalisation hinders democracy. As this exam-
ple demonstrates, the leader’s exit may occur through undemocratic means under 
very dramatic conditions. To work as an effective check in these contexts, the term-
limit rule cannot operate in isolation. It needs support from other institutions that 
also provide checks to presidential power (such as courts or the legislature), a viable 
opposition, and an active civil society. The role of the partisan opposition and the 
active engagement of the citizenry has been crucial in the cases of Argentina and 
Senegal meanwhile. 
Ambiguous Effects in the Grey Zone
We have seen that in theory, presidential term limits are rules that strengthen lib-
eral democracies, but that, in practice, their assessment is difficult. They exist in 
authoritarian and democratic settings alike, and we need to analyse them in context 
to understand what role they play. This is particularly important regarding term-
limit reforms. Very often such reforms take place in a grey zone wherein democratic 
and authoritarian practices co-exist. Their amendment may work in either direction 
depending on the broader context. By looking at the adopted rule types, the direc-
tion, and the frequency of reform, as we have done in these pages, we can better 
assess the consequences of the reform enacted. Despite the variety of individual 
trajectories, the – usually frequent and progressive – relaxation of the term-limit 
rule brings about a democratic weakening. In the extreme cases, term-limit aboli-
tion is a good indicator of a democratic backlash – and usually the last step in a 
series of institutional assaults that have previously led to executive aggrandisement 
(Bermeo 2016). 
Yet, compliance with term limits and the occurrence of the electoral turnover 
of power alone do not guarantee democracy. We have learnt that the association of 
term limits with democracy in practice is more complex than the theory suggests. 
Sometimes leaders elected in a turnover do not pursue agendas that foster democ-
racy and socio-economic development, as we have seen in Senegal in 2000 – where 
the turnover president Wade subsequently ruled in an autocratic way. In weak dem-
ocratic contexts, the sound functioning of other political institutions, civil society, 
and the media, as checks on the executive, is crucial. However if electoral turnovers 
are a credible possibility in competitive settings, they provide a horizon to navigate 
towards and fuel expectations of change – which in turn enhance commitment to 
the rules and may induce stronger checks and balances, such as independent courts. 
Even if the consequences of term limits and electoral turnover are not straight-
forward, what we do know is that term limits are potentially important checks on 
power and also that they are increasingly socially valued. This is noticeable in Af-
rica, where the rule – in spite of its only rather short existence to date – seems to 
be taking root. The Afrobarometer survey reveals that a large majority of the inter-
viewed Africans support presidential term limits. In the most recent survey round, 
74 per cent of respondents across 33 countries agreed with the idea of two-term 
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limits; the level of support for it remained stable in comparison to the last survey 
rounds (Afrobarometer 2020). Moreover, presidents’ manipulations have driven 
numerous people to the streets to demand rule reinstatement, as we have recently 
seen in Guinea. 
Presidential term limits have repeatedly come under political pressure. As a 
principle, they are likely to remain in the respective constitutions even while their 
contestation continues here and there. The form and path that their reform follow 
in practice will need to be monitored closely, because they always have something 
to tell us on the state of democracy, the risk of backlash, or regarding the chances 
of regime liberalisation.
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